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McQueen and Vaidman argue that the Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum 
mechanics provides local causal explanations of the outcomes of experiments in our experience 
that is due to the total effect of all the worlds together. We show that although the explanation 
is local in one world, it requires a causal influence that travels across different worlds. We 
further argue that in the MWI the local nature of our experience is not derivable from the 
Hilbert space structure, but has to be added to it as an independent postulate. This is due to 
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In their contribution to this volume, McQueen and Vaidman argue that common sense requires 
that explanations in physics be not only causal,1 but also local (they give some necessary 
conditions for what counts as ‘local’; see end of section 3 in their paper). Their main claim is 
that the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics (originally due to Everett 
([1957]) provides local explanations of the outcomes of experiments that in other 
interpretations of quantum mechanics seem to require (some sort of) non-locality. In this sense, 
they argue, the MWI restores common sense to quantum mechanics.  
 
The causal role of the worlds 
 
We accept here the necessary conditions assumed by McQueen and Vaidman on what counts 
as local; and we grant (for the sake of the argument) their position that fundamental physics 
describes causal processes. To see what is at stake here, consider, for example, what happens 
in the experiment of the nested Mach-Zender Interferometer ( MZI) (Figure 5 in McQueen and 
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e.g. determinism). 
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Vaidman). They admit that the locality of the explanation is restored not by looking at what 
happens in one or another ‘parallel’ world, but rather in all parallel worlds taken together. But 
what does this exactly mean? In the MWI it turns out that physical facts in one world depend 
not only on whatever happens in that world, but rather on interactions literally occurring in 
other parallel worlds, so that causation might be spatio-temporally local, but only in virtue of 
these other-worldly interactions. Let us see how this idea plays out.  
 
Take, for example, the world in which the particle is detected by D2 (in the nested MZI, see 
Figures 5 and 10 in McQueen and Vaidman). Call this world, our world. The explanation 
McQueen and Vaidman suggest of what causes D2 to click in our world is that there is a 
continuous trace of the motion of the particle in our world from the origin of the experiment 
along path C up to D2. However, in our world there is also a trace in the inner box, which 
cannot be explained locally by the motion of our particle through the inner box, since no trace 
in our world leads to our particle passing through the inner box (see McQueen and Vaidman, 
Figure 5). Here the intuition is that a local explanation of the trace in the inner box (which 
appears as strong as the trace along path C) based on physical matters of fact in our world 
requires that there are traces of the particle in our world that lead to the inner box. But there 
are no such traces in our world. According to McQueen and Vaidman the physical facts that 
explain this inner trace occur in another world. In that other world, there is a continuous trace 
of the motion of a copy of our particle from the origin through the inner box up to detector D3 
(see Figure 10c). And their point about local causation is that this motion of the copy particle 
in the other world leaves a trace in the inner box also in our world.  
 
So the situation is this: (i) a copy of our particle is detected by (a copy of detector) D3 in some 
other world, but not in ours, and therefore this copy particle might be said to exist in that world; 
(ii) this copy particle leaves a continuous trace in the other world from the origin of the 
experiment via the (copy) inner box up to D3 (we shall omit from now on the term ‘copy’ 
unless it is needed); (iii) our particle does not leave a trace that leads to the inner box, so if its 
motion were the cause of the trace we see in the inner box, this trace would be created either 
by some sort of a nonlocal influence in our world (from path C to the inner box), or else by 
some sort of a nonlocal motion in which our particle travels along both path C and the inner 
box (without leaving a trace that leads to or from the inner box; (iv) to avoid this sort of 
nonlocality, the claim (on this proposal) is that it is the copy particle in the other world that 
causes (or creates, or what have you) the trace in the inner box also in our world.  
 
We grant that in the MWI, one might take the trace in the inner box in our world to be some 
sort of a ‘photograph’ of the other ‘parallel’ world, where in the ‘photograph’ we have a 
‘record’ of a segment of the trace left locally by the copy particle in the (copy) inner box of the 
other world. But we don’t see that this local behavior in the other world leads to some sort of 
a local picture of how things play out causally in our world, even on this way of looking at the 
trace (that is, as a ‘photograph’ in our world of segments of the motion of the copy particle in 
the other world), since also on this way of thinking we have a cross-world causation by which 
the ‘record’ of the trace is formed. Same points (mutatis mutandis) arise with respect to the 
other experiments described by McQueen and Vaidman. 
 
The upshot is that particles in the MWI leave traces both in the world where they exist, but also 
in other worlds, in which they don’t exist. So: the explanation is said to be local, since 
spacetime splits together with the particles, so that there is no influence at space-like separation 
within a world, but the causal influence literally travels across ‘parallel’ worlds. This seems 
to us to stretch the concept of locality beyond common sense, if not beyond breaking point, 
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even if one understands causation weakly in terms of counterfactual dependence rather than by 
straightforward physical interaction. 
 
This leads to the more general question of how precisely one should understand the concept of 
‘worlds’ in the MWI, which is indispensable, but quite tricky. In this context it seems to us that 
an old problem that has been mounted against the MWI2 (called the ‘preferred basis problem’) 
which is believed by many to have been solved by decoherence3 is still open for reasons that 
have escaped the literature up to now. We shall sketch the argument here, which is based on 
(Hemmo and Shenker [2019a]). 
 
Consequences of the preferred basis problem in the MWI 
 
The problem of the preferred basis stems from the mathematical fact that the quantum state is 
symmetric (or invariant) under the (infinitely many) choices of basis of Hilbert space in which 
it can be written. By this we mean that given the Hilbert space structure, a choice of basis in 
which the quantum state is described makes no difference with respect to the physical state and 
the facts that obtain in the universe when it is in this state, it makes no difference with respect 
to the time evolution of the quantum state, and it makes no difference with respect to the 
predictions of future facts. Moreover, the standard description of local interactions (as well as 
the decoherence interaction) presupposes a factorisation of the set of all degrees of freedom of 
the universe into subsets (which are the subsystems), for example, a measured system (say the 
spin + position of an electron in a Stern-Gerlach device), a photographic screen, an observer, 
and environment. This standard facorisation is intuitive and justified by our experience. 
However, there are theoretically other factorisations: for example, into: the electron; the left 
hemisphere of the observer’s brain + one cubic meter of air molecules in the laboratory; and 
the rest of the degrees of freedom of the universe. We call this the factorisation-symmetry of 
Hilbert space by which we mean the following: There are many (possibly an infinite number 
of) factorisations of the universal Hilbert space into sets of degrees of freedom (or subsystems), 
such that given the quantum state of the universe, all the factorisations are on equal footing; in 
other words, there are no facts determining a preferred factorisation. But our experience 
corresponds (by and large) to the standard factorisation, and in addition also to certain local 
states of macroscopic systems given the standard factorisation. In this sense the standard 
factorisation and the local basis of states are preferred, but there is no deeper account of why 
they are preferred. In particular, the structure of the interactions does not explain this 
preference, because it presupposes it. When one appeals to the structure of the interactions in 
the universe, say the decoherence interaction, or the fact that the interactions between 
macroscopic systems are local, one presupposes the factorisation that features in our experience 
of the total set of degrees of freedom. This is acceptable, but we should note already at this 
stage, that it does not explain our experience. In other factorisations, the structure of the 
interactions between the subsystems, induced by the same total Hamiltonian, is different. 
 
Let us illustrate this idea by the following figure: 
 
 
2 There are many versions of the MWI: see Everett’s ([1957]) ‘relative-state’ formulation; and later 
versions, for example: (DeWitt [1970]; Zeh [1973], [2001]; Deutsch [1985]; Zurek [1993]; Saunders 
[1995]; Vaidman [1998], [2014]; Wallace [2012]). Our argument applies to all the versions. 
3 For decoherence, see (Zurek [1993]; Joos et al. [2003]). 
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Figure 1: Branching and other structures 
 
On the left side of Figure 1 we depict (very roughly) the branching structure which matches 
our classical-like experience is described by the psi-basis, which is the basis of localised states, 
and the same structure as it is described by another basis, we call the phi-basis. In these two 
bases, the interference terms (denoted by the thin black lines) between the branches are small 
and the interaction Hamiltonian picks out the psi-basis as dynamically preferred, in the sense 
that the interference terms in this basis are small and the states match our experience. Formally, 
in the phi-description of the branching on the left side we do not add up the similar terms in 
the different branches. It is a fact that under the time evolution of the universal state the 
interference between the branches in the psi-basis are very small; and this fact is common to 
the two descriptions of the branching structure on the left side: in terms of the psi-basis and the 
phi-basis. By contrast, on the right side of the figure, we depicted a different structure that (by 
the symmetry of bases in Hilbert space) equally exists in the same quantum state when it is 
written in the phi-basis. In this structure (on the left side of the figure) the interference terms 
(denoted by the thick black lines) between the branches are large. 
 
Vaidman ([2014], [2019]) and McQueen (private correspondence) acknowledge the 
factorisation-symmetry and the symmetry of bases in Hilbert space as well as the preferred 
basis problem that follows from these symmetries for the MWI: 
Mathematically, one can decompose the wave function of the universe into a superposition of 
orthogonal components, not just as in [state (5)], but in many other ways that will not provide a familiar 
world’s picture in every branch. So, critics might say that the proposal is circular: I define by fiat what 
I want to explain. First, a simple definition that is confirmed by observation sounds to me like a 
legitimate strategy. But there is also a more specific answer. The basis of the decomposition is indeed 
preferred. (Vaidman [2019], p. 100) 
But the question is: which facts make the decomposition corresponding to our experience 
preferred? Or: what makes it the case that our experience is described by components of the 
state in the preferred basis (and factorisation)? According to Vaidman and McQueen the local 
structure of the interactions singles out the decomposition of states such as (5) in terms of the 
psi-states in which macroscopic systems are in localised states (see the left side of Figure 1). 
But as we argued above this claim already presupposes our experience, it does not follow from 
the structure of the universal Hilbert space alone. In measurements, for example, the interaction 
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Hamiltonian depends on the position of a macroscopic pointer, or the position of ink marks on 
a piece of paper, or the position of neurons in our brains, etc., and even if one disregards the 
decoherence interaction with the environment, the position basis, or more generally the 
expansion of the state in terms of narrowly peaked Gaussians in position are preferred. In our 
example of Figure 1, the psi-states (corresponding to the branch structure on the left side of the 
figure) are the localised states which match our experience, whereas the phi-states (depicted 
on the right side of the figure) are delocalised superpositions of the psi-states and do not match 
our experience. But what in the Hilbert space structure accounts for this asymmetry between 
the psi-states and the phi-states? Vaidman ([2019]) argues, in a way that might seem to 
undermine this point, that the localised states are preferred, because they are stable over time: 
Until now I have not mentioned time evolution. Everything was considered at a particular moment. But 
we cannot experience anything at zero time. We need an order of 0.1 seconds to identify our experience. 
Thus, the world needs some finite time to be defined. The world has to be stable, at least on the scale 
of seconds. Locality of interactions in nature ensures that only the decomposition of wave functions 
corresponding to well-localized macroscopic objects can be stable. A quantum state describing the 
superposition of a macroscopic object in separate locations with a particular phase evolves almost 
immediately into a mixture that has a large component with a different phase. This obvious fact is 
analyzed in numerous papers using the buzzword ‘decoherence.’ (Vaidman [2019], p. 100) 
This goes along the tradition of Everett’s original argument form 1957. But why, for example 
the world or our experience has to be stable, as Vaidman and McQueen require? Of course, as 
a matter of empirical fact, the world as we experience it, is stable. But the MWI should derive 
this fact from its fundamental postulates and laws, not assume it. Here, as we mentioned earlier, 
evolutionary arguments to the effect that stability of the preferred states is essential for survival 
come in.4 The idea is that since our experience is associated with components of the universal 
state, the components need be stable over time in order for biological systems to evolve and 
survive along the branch structure defined by these components. It is true that in biology the 
standard description of evolutionary survival is in terms of adaptive systems that are immersed 
in some environment that survive stably over time. But how does this condition become a 
constraint on fundamental physics which is compatible also with universes in which there are 
no biological systems at all? After all, whether or not there is experience of our kind that is 
stable over time, or for that matter, whether or not certain biological kinds survive, need not be 
a factor that determines whether or not something is real. If it is true, this fact should be added 
to the Hilbert space structure. 
 
Let us suppose (for the sake of the argument) that stability of components of the universal state 
in some basis is indeed a condition for survival. But given the MWI the universal state now, in 
the present moment, is a state like (5): why do we not experience now the unstable phi-basis in 
which we are in superpositions of the localised states? In this case, if we grant the evolutionary 
argument, we would presumably cease to evolve as experiencing agents, and we would not be 
around to ask questions about our experience. But this is just bad luck for us. Why should the 
laws of physics care about our luck, or our evolution in the first place? Perhaps it is true, but if 
so, some additional structure backing this up and breaking the basis-symmetry of Hilbert space 
is needed, in much the same way that in the standard view about classical statistical mechanics 
(for example) the past hypothesis is added to break the time-symmetry of the equations of 
motion and account for the increase of entropy towards the future (see e.g., Feynman [1965]).  
 
Our conclusion applies also to the versions of the MWI which rely on decoherence to define 
the preferred basis (see Zurek [1993]; Zeh [2001]). One might say that the most obvious 
justification of choosing the decoherence basis (or the localizes states basis) as preferred (as 
 
4 Vaidman, McQueen, private correspondence; it seems to us that this is also Zurek’s view (1993). 
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well as the corresponding factorisation) to define the worlds or the branching is that in this 
basis the on-diagonal elements of the reduced states of the macroscopic systems that appear in 
our experience can be directly interpreted as the relative frequencies of the states of these 
systems in our experience. Of course, this can be done (and this is what is usually done)! But 
our point is that this ‘obvious’ addition requires adding structure to Hilbert space beyond the 
structure given by the quantum state. That is, one must add structure to Hilbert space that will 
underlie the facts that make it the case that we have this experience. In particular, Wallace 
([2012]) introduces a high-level law (he calls Dennett’s criterion) for the emergence of the 
worlds (or our experience), the role of which is to make some patterns in the quantum state 
real. This high-level criterion is based on functionalist ideas in the foundations of the special 
sciences. However, in his influential paper on the functional-state hypothesis, Putnam ([1975], 
p. 436) has already noted that: “the functional-state hypothesis is not incompatible with 
dualism!” Moreover, it is provable (regardless of quantum mechanics) that if a functionally-
defined property is not identical to a micro-physical property (that is, in quantum mechanics, 
of the quantum state), then the functional-state hypothesis implies that any token of the 
quantum state from which the functional property emerges must itself have some non-physical 
property (see Hemmo and Shenker [2019a], [2019b]). So: functionalism is not only compatible 
with dualism, it entails additional non-physical structure.  
 
Vaidman and McQueen are aware of the crucial difference with respect to the preferred basis 
problem and the account of our experience that holds between, on the one hand, the MWI, and 
on the other hand collapse and hidden variable theories (like, respectively, the GRW theory 
and Bohm’s theory) in which the additional laws that are added to the Hilbert space structure 
(respectively, GRW collapses or flashes, Bohmian trajectories) account for our familiar 
macroscopic experience. In the GRW theory the states that we experience are singled out by 
the flashes or the collapses of the wavefunction, in Bohm’s theory by the trajectories in 3D 
space (or perhaps in 3N space; this is debated in the literature; see Albert and Ney 2013). But 
in the MWI if one only pre-supposes the Hilbert space structure, there is no account for why in 
the first place we experience the components of the universal state in the preferred basis rather 
than in some other (stable or not) basis, or why we do not experience the entire superposition 
of states like (5) despite the fact that we are in such states and our brain states are superposed 
in the way depicted in Figure 1. One has to accept that our experience corresponds to the 
localised psi-states familiar from classical mechanics as a brute fact. It seems to us that 
Vaidman (2019, p. 98) acknowledges this point when he says:  
In quantum mechanics without collapse we must add a postulate to connect to our experience, because 
mathematics does not provide a (unique) picture corresponding to what we see around us. 
Perhaps for Vaidman and McQueen adding a postulate such as the locality of the interactions 
in our universe, which as we argued presupposes our experience, is nevertheless more justified 
than the GRW collapses or Bohm’s trajectories. However, it follows from our argument that, 
contrary to the received wisdom, the MWI is not more parsimonious and therefore it has no 
advantage over other theories that solve the measurement problem (such as Bohm’s ([1952]) 
theory, or the collapse theory by Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber ([1986]; see Bell [1987]; or the 
many-minds theory of Albert and Loewer [1988]). All these theories introduce additional laws 
or structure and additional elements of reality over and above the Schrödinger equation for the 
quantum state, and, as we argued in this paper, the MWI is no exception in this regard. They 
all solve the measurement problem by changing drastically quantum mechanics, for good or 
for worse. Here, obviously, different questions may come up, such as the compatibility of the 
extra laws with relativity theory. But Ockham’s razor does not cut in favour of the MWI.  
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Many often reject the MWI on the grounds that the multiplicity of the worlds is extravagant. 
This does not strike us as a good argument; it seems to us that none of the interpretations of 
quantum mechanics is common-sensical. While the set of common sense beliefs is not uniquely 
and sharply delineated and is often given by examples that appear to be psychologically 
irresistible and intuitively true, each and every interpretation of quantum mechanics is strongly 
incompatible with some of the most central common sense beliefs. In this sense quantum 
mechanics in all its interpretations shutters our common sense, if one takes it to be true. The 
result is that: Naïve realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, shows that naïve realism is 
false. Therefore, naïve realism, if true, is false; therefore, it is false (Russell, 1940, p. 15). The 
question arises: how do the common sense beliefs come about in a quantum-mechanical world 
and what justifies relying on empirical evidence which we understand common-sensically as 
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